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THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF
OHIO STATUTES
The propriety of retroactive application of state statutes has
long plagued Ohio courts. The recent cases of Kilbreath v. Rudy1
and Bagsarian v. Parker Metal Co. 2 have caused the problem to sur-
face once again. In Kilbreath, plaintiff alleged an injury resulting
from a medical prescription which had been incorrectly refilled on
or about March 3, 1965. The petition was filed January 23, 1967,
and service of summons on one of the three defendants, a foreign
corporation, was undertaken pursuant to the Ohio Long Arm Stat-
ute.3 The cause of action arose six months before the Ohio Long
Arm Statute became effective. 4 The foreign corporation appeared
specially and moved to quash the service, on the ground that the
Ohio Long Arm Statute was inapplicable to this case because of the
general policy against retroactivity. The Court of Common Pleas of
Franklin County agreed, and dismissed the petition as to the foreign
corporation.5 The court of appeals reversed that judgment6 and cer-
tified the record to the Ohio Supreme Court on the ground that the
decision was in conflict with judgments of the Court of Appeals for
Cuyahoga County.7 The Ohio Supreme Court held the Ohio Long
Arm Statute applicable to causes of action existing, but not filed, be-
fore the effective date of that statute."
In Bagsarian, a products liability case in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Ohio, jurisdiction was based
on diversity of citizenship. Service of process was made on defendant
company under the provisions of the Ohio Long Arm Statute. The
defendant metal company appeared specially for the purpose of con-
testing jurisdiction. Service of process in cases brought in the district
courts is effective if the method used would be effective under the
laws of the state in which the court sits.9 The defendant claimed that
1 16 Ohio St. 2d 70 (1968).
2 15 Ohio Misc. 80, 282 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
3 Oio REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 2307.381-.385 (Page Supp. 1967).
4 Id. These sections became effective September 28, 1965.
G See Kilbreath v. Rudy, 16 Ohio St. 2d 70, 71 (1968).
0 Kilbreath v. Rudy, No. 8788 (Ct. App. Franklin County, November 14, 1967).
7 See Kilbreath v. Rudy, 16 Ohio St. 2d 70, 71 (1968).
8 Id. at 72.
9 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7), 4(e).
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personal jurisdiction was not obtained because the Ohio Long Arm
Statute may not be applied retroactively. The alleged injury oc-
curred on June 10, 1965, more than three months prior to the effec-
tive date of the statute. Defendant's motion to dismiss was overruled.
Due to a judicially created exception to the common law rule against
retroactivity, remedial statutes such as the Ohio Long Arm Statute
are available in causes of action arising prior to their effective dates,
but not then the subject of litigation in any court.10
Before Kilbreath, decisions ruling on the retroactivity of the
Ohio Long Arm Statute presented the following anomalous situation.
A plaintiff who attempted service of process under the Ohio Long Arm
Statute where the cause of action arose prior to the effective date of
the statute, would have found his action dismissed in the Ohio courts
of Cuyahoga"l and Lake12 counties. However, the United States Dis-
trict Court encompassing those counties would have allowed the ser-
vice to stand.'3 The opposite was true in the Southern District of
Ohio. There the United States District Court would have quashed
such service 14 while the state courts in Hamilton 5 and Franklin'
counties would have allowed the plaintiff to proceed. Much of this
confusion was due to the failure to distinguish between the several
issues involved. The following discussion is an attempt to set forth
criteria for judicial determination of the retroactivity question in
whatever context it may arise. Where examples are helpful, the Ohio
Long Arm Statute will generally be utilized.
Before considering the question of retroactivity, the courts must
determine whether the statutory terminology may constitutionally
apply to the facts alleged. In the case of long arm statutes, after find-
ing that the defendant is one whom the statute covers by its terms,
the court must determine whether he had such minimum contacts
with the forum state so that the maintenance of the suit does not of-
fend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."lv Af-
10 Bagsarian v. Parker Metal Co., 15 Ohio Misc. 80, 90, 282 F. Supp. 766, 772
(N.D. Ohio 1968).
11 Lantsbury v. Tilley Lamp Co., No. 28085 (Ct. App. Cuyahoga County, May 15,
1967).
12 Crilley v. Cooper, No. 46965 (C.P. Lake County).
13 Busch v. Service Plastics, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 136, 144-45 (ND. Ohio 1966);
Bagsarian v. Parker Metal Co., 15 Ohio Misc. 80, 282 F. Supp. 766 (ND. Ohio 1968).
14 See Partin v. Hassan Motors, Inc., 863 F.2d 104, 105 (6th Cir. 1966).
15 O'Mara v. Alberto-Culver Co., 6 Ohio Misc. 132, 215 N.E.2d 735 (C. P. Hamilton
County 1966).
16 Kilbreath v. Rudy, No. 8788 (Ct. App. Franklin County, November 14, 1967).
17 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See also Hanson
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ter this determination, the question of retroactivity must be consid-
ered. This involves analyzing any constitutional prohibitions against
retroactivity, applicable statutes and legislative intent with regard
to the statute. Absent any clear legislative intent, the court must ap-
ply its own criteria and decision making rules on the question of
retroactive application of the statute.
The Constitution of the United States provides that "No state
shall . .. pass any.. . ex post facto law . "..."18 This provision pro-
hibits the punishment of any act that was not prohibited when com-
mitted, and bars infliction of greater punishment than was previ-
ously provided for.' 9 This prohibition secures substantial personal
rights against subsequent legislation, but does not limit legislative
control of remedies or modes of procedure which do not affect mat-
ters of substance.2 0 The contract clause provides equivalent limita-
tions on civil legislation.21 Consequently, the contract clause is not
a constitutional bar to providing new or altered civil remedies for
prior events.
Ohio is one of several states which have constitutional provi-
sions specifically prohibiting retroactive legislation.22 The Ohio Con-
stitution provides: "The general assembly shall have no power to
pass retroactive laws, .. 23 In Smith v. New York Central R.R.,24 the
Ohio Supreme Court held this provision should not be construed to
apply to legislative enactments which are remedial in nature. This
is because a statute which is remedial in its operation on existing
rights, obligations, duties or interests is not within the class of mis-
chiefs against which the provision was to safeguard.25 Ohio courts have
often held that a procedural change in the law may apply to any
proceedings commenced after the effective date even though the
right or cause of action arose prior thereto. 26 Consequently, it would
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Sun-X International Co. v. Witt, 413 S.W.2d 761 (rex.
Civ. App. 1967).
18 U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 10.
19 See, e.g., Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 589-90 (1896).
20 Id.
21 See Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive
Legislation, 73 HARV. L. Rrv. 692, 696 (1960).
22 Greenblatt, judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51 Nw. U.L.
R v. 540, 544 (1956).
23 OHIO CONsr. art. II, § 28. See also note 16 supra.
24 122 Ohio St. 45, 170 N.E. 637 (1930).
25 Id. at 48, 170 N.E. at 638.
26 See, e.g., State ex rel. Holdridge v. Industrial Comm'n, 11 Ohio St. 2d 175, 228
N.E.2d 621 (1967).
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appear that these federal and state constitutional barriers to retro-
active application of statutes result in identical restrictions on legis-
lative actions. They bar retroactivity where the statute is substantive.
Application of the remedial-substantive distinction is difficult
because of the elusive nature of these concepts. The Ohio Supreme
Court recently noted:
It is doubtful if a perfect definition of "substantive law" or
"procedural or remedial law" could be devised. However, the
authorities agree that, in general terms, substantive law is that
which creates duties, rights, and obligations, while procedural or
remedial law prescribes the methods of enforcement of rights or
obtaining redress.27
Perhaps a more precise definition, though equally difficult to
apply, is set forth in General Industries Co. v. Jones.28 Citing Justice
Story, the court said:
Upon principle ... [no] . . . statute which takes away or im-
pairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a
new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability,
in respect to transactions or considerations past .... 29
may be applied retroactively. The traditional argument that a stat-
ute may not abrogate a vested right results in circular reasoning since
a right is generally said to be vested only when it has been so far per-
fected that it cannot be taken away by statute.30 Decisions based
solely on apparent remedial-substantive distinctions tend to over-
simplify the constitutional issues involved. The federal courts have
traditionally interpreted the constitutional bars against retroactive
application of laws in the light of the due process clause.31 In the
states which have similar prohibitions in their own constitutions, in-
terpretations of such provisions tend to follow due process criteria
closely.32 The first test of whether a statute may be applied retroac-
27 Id. at 178, 228 N.E.2d at 623.
28 89 Ohio App. 43, 100 N.E.2d 703 (1950).
29 Id. at 44, 100 N.E.2d at 704.
30 Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legis-
lation, 73 HAv. L. Ra,. 692, 696 (1960); Note, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights,
5 Tax. L. Rav. 231, 245-48 (1927).
31 See generally, Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of
Retroactive Legislation, 73 HAIRv. L. REv. 692 (1960); Rubin, Interpretive Problems
of Ohio's Long-Arm Statute, 19 CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 347 (1968); Slawson, Constitu-
tional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CALF. L. Rtv.
216 (1960); Note, Retroactive Expansion of State Court Jurisdiction Over Persons,
63 COLuM. L. Ray. 1105 (1963).
82 Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Lawmaking, 51 Nw. UJ.. REV.
54, 544 (1966).
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tively is, then, essentially a question of substantive due process.
This due process test requires a balancing of the public inter-
ests involved with the severity of the statutory modification or abro-
gation of the pre-statute right. When the statute remedies some
serious evil resulting from an emergency situation, such as the depres-
sion, the public interest may outweigh almost any abrogation of
rights.33 Another consideration must be the availability of alterna-
tive methods, not involving retroactive application of a statute, of
carrying out the avowed public interest.
The decisions indicate that a legislature may modify remedies
for the assertion or enforcement of a right, but may not abolish the
right itself.34 However, the relevant factor is not whether the statute
abolishes rights or remedies, but rather the degree to which it
changes the legal incident or effect of a claim arising from a pre-
statute event.3 5
The reliance interest must be considered as a factor in measur-
ing the justification for abridging legal interests. Where a statute has
become a likely basis for reasonable and substantial reliance by per-
sons who may have changed their position, the policy against retro-
activity is strong. The nature of the interest affected must also be
weighed. The interest itself may be of such magnitude as to deserve
protection. Analysis of the interest asserted in light of the reliance
interest may prove conclusively that the public's interest is so out-
weighed as to prohibit retroactive application. The public interest
in statutory stability must also be balanced against the needs of a
fluid and changing society. Application of these balancing tests is
not an easy task for the courts. The point at which these multitudes
of conflicting interests balance cannot be determined by any general
formula.38
In Ohio, once the court has determined retroactive application
of a statute does not violate due process, it must examine the stat-
33 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 598 (1934). Substantive
statutes which are not applied retroactively may nonetheless affect pre-existing rights.
This was true, for example, in Louisville 8: Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467
(1911), where the public policy which prompted the prohibition of giving free trans-
portation on railroads was sufficiently strong to bar enforcement of a contract for free
passage executed for consideration prior to enactment of the statute.
34 See, e.g., League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156 (1902).
35 See Ocha v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139 (1939), where the order by the
military governor reducing the time needed to gain title by adverse possession from
20 to 6 years was held invalid when applied to someone against whom the 6 years
had elapsed at the time the order was issued, but not as to those who could still
reasonably contest the claim of adverse possession.
SO Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 849, 355 (1908).
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utory restrictions on retroactive application of statutes. Section 1.20
of the Ohio Revised Code provides:
When a statute is repealed or amended, such repeal or amend-
ment does not affect pending actions, prosecutions or proceed-
ings, civil or criminal. When the repeal or amendment relates
to the remedy, it does not affect pending actions, prosecutions,
or proceedings, unless so expressed, nor does any repeal or
amendment affect causes of such action, prosecution, or proceed-
ing, existing at the time of such amendment or repeal, unless
otherwise expressly provided in the amending or repealing act.37
The first sentence of this statute generally prohibits retroactive
application of statutes which repeal or amend existing legislation.
However, the subsequent sentence recognizes the common law ex-
ception which allows remedial statutes to be applied retroactively in
cases where the statute in question involves either the repeal or
amendment of an existing statute. In such a case, the statute is to be
applied retroactively only if the legislature addresses itself to this
question in the act itself and provides explicitly for retroactive ap-
plication.
The coverage of section 1.20 extends only to legislation that
amends or repeals existing legislation. Amending statutes alter,
change or add to existing legislation without destroying it,3s whereas
repealing statutes abolish or cancel existing legislation. 9 Statutes can
be repealed or amended by implication. The courts are very reluc-
tant to hold that a statute is impliedly repealed or amended, but
where an intention to repeal or amend existing legislation must be
inferred from subsequent irreconcilable legislation, the last word of
the legislature is controlling.40 Whether an amendment or repeal is
implicit or explicit, there must be pre-existing legislation covering
the specific subject matter of the amending or repealing statute if
section 1.20 is to apply.41
87 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.20 (Page 1953).
8 State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. v. Ach, 113 Ohio St. 482, 149 N.E. 405 (1925); State
ex rel. Forchheimer v. LeBlond, 108 Ohio St. 41, 50, 140 N.E. 491, 494 (1923).
39 Cincinnati, Wilmington, & Zanesville R.R. v. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St. 77
(1852).
40 See Cleveland & Western Coal Co. v. O'Brien, 98 Ohio St. 14, 120 N.E. 214
(1918).
41 There seems to be dictum to the contrary in Cincinnati H. & D. R.R. v. Hedges,
63 Ohio St. 339, 58 N.E. 804 (1900), which states that the principle of what is now
section 1.20, Ohio Revised Code, is a declaration of the policy of our law, which forbids
giving a statute retroactive effect, even though remedial in character, unless the act
contains an express provision to that effect. It has also been held that statutes are not
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Where there is no such existing legislation, section 1.20 is en-
tirely inapplicable on the question of retroactivity. The court is not
bound by the requirement of explicit legislative attention to retro-
activity, and must consider the propriety of retroactive application of
a statute on its own merits. There are several tests for making such a
decision. The courts might conclude that section 1.20 has fostered a
legislative custom of expressing its intention in each statute which it
wishes to be retroactively applied. This would mean that, absent any
legislative statements to the contrary, no statute is to be applied re-
troactively. 42 However, the converse could also be argued. The prac-
tice of indicating when a statute should be applied retroactively
might also reasonably be limited to only amending or repealing leg-
islation. This would be sound legislative policy, since section 1.20
requires a statement of intent only in these situations. Consequently,
section 1.20 appears to offer no assistance in determining legislative
intent.
Another approach, applied in Agrashell, Inc. v. Sirotta Co.,
43
would be to assume that the legislature intended to make a statute as
broad as the federal and state constitutions allow, and therefore all
remedial statutes are to be applied retroactively unless a contrary
legislative intention is expressed. Such a rule has little to do with
legislative intent, however. It is simply a judicial policy judgment
that remedial innovations should have maximum accessibility. It may
also be a method for easing administration of the court's business by
minimizing the need for calendar references in every case in which the
statute may be applied. Such bothersome attention to dates is neces-
sary where different procedures apply to cases arising at different
times. However, the advisability of retroactive application may vary
from one statute to another, and should be examined anew with the
enactment of each new statute. Presumptions of a legislative intention
to maximize the impad of a new statute avoid important analysis of
the legitimacy of such extensions.
In Ohio, the courts could conclude, given the section 1.20 require-
to be construed retroactively applicable unless, on the face of the instrument or enact-
ment, the legislature has expressed its contrary intention. This dictum has been over-
ruled in a long line of subsequent cases, and new legislation which neither repeals
nor amends existing legislation may be applied retroactively if the statute is remedial.
Bagsarian v. Parker Metal Co., 15 Ohio Misc. 80, 282 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Ohio 1968);
Kilbreath v. Rudy, 16 Ohio St. 2d 70 (1968).
42 Schlagheck v. Winterfeld, 108 Ohio App. 299, 161 N.E.2d 498 (1958).
43 344 F.2d 583, 587 (2d Cir. 1965); Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d
281, 200 N.E.2d 427 (1964).
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ments that the legislature must address itself explicitly to the question
of retroactivity in instances of amending or repealing legislation only,
that it is up to the courts to decide on the retroactive application of
all other types of statutes where the legislature is silent. The legis-
lature may have intended that existing legislation invites reliance and
that therefore changes in existing laws should be made retroactive
only when the legislature feels that retroactivity is needed to carry
out its policy, and the legislature so explicitly states in the statute.
However, with new legislation, where reliance is not so strongly war-
ranted, the question of retroactivity is best adapted to judicial deter-
mination. Absent any legislative expression of intent to the contrary,
it would seem that it is up to the courts to decide retroactivity.
With regard to the long arm statute the courts much reach this
policy decision by balancing several countervailing interests. Reliance
on local laws and the laws of other jurisdictions, the inconvenience
to a defendant of having to defend in a foreign forum, the possibility
of a large number of default judgments, nuisance suits, and other
such considerations tend to disfavor retroactivity. Against this the
courts must weigh the state's interest. In the case of long arm statutes
this is the interest in expanding its jurisdiction over persons to the
constitutionally permissible limits in order to protect its citizens
against acts of nonresidents by providing a convenient forum, the
desirability of having improved remedies available to all, the desira-
bility of uniform laws and the possibility of confusion resulting from
the use of different remedies in similar causes of action arising at dif-
ferent times. Basically, there must be a balancing between the coun-
tervailing interests of the state and the parties affected by new legis-
lation.
In both Kilbreath and Bagsarian, there can be little doubt that
there were no constitutional prohibitions against applying the Ohio
Long Arm Statute retroactively. The Illinois Long Arm Statute,44
which is generally considered to be the model for all legislation simi-
lar to the Ohio Long Arm Statute, was held to be retroactively appli-
cable by the Illinois Supreme Court. 45 The United States Supreme
Court has held that legislation which deals with substituted service
of process similar to the Ohio Long Arm Statute is remedial, and that
a defendant has no vested right not to be sued in a particular state. 46
Any argument based on reliance by the defendants in cases where
44 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 16, 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968).
45 Nelson v. Miller, 11 II. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
46 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 555 U.S. 220 (1957).
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the Ohio Long Arm Statute would be applicable is, at best, tenuous.
The trend toward the expansion of personal jurisdiction to the limits
allowed by due process has been readily discernible since McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co.47 and Nelson v. Miller.48 It would also
seem that there is very little danger of defeating reasonable expecta-
tions where a statute modifies jurisdictional requirements in tort
cases.
49
The Ohio legislature must have considered the interests men-
tioned above in determining the value of long arm statutes, and since
the legislature has decided in favor of the prospective plaintiff by
passing such a statute, there would have to be strong interests on the
defendant's side before the court could have decided against the re-
troactive application of the Ohio Long Arm Statute.
While the conclusion reached in Kilbreath and Bagsarian is cor-
rect, it is believed the foregoing more adequately sets forth the ana-
lytical path to be followed in solving problems of retroactive appli-
cation of Ohio statutes.
Klaus M. Ziermaier
47 Id.
48 11 Ill. 2d 78, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
49 Id. at 382, 143 N.E.2d at 676. Also, while the conduct involved in such tort
cases as assault and battery, trespass, nuisance, and libel might conceivably be under-
taken in reliance upon the lack of jurisdiction, such reliance would not be deserving
of protection and would not outweigh the state's interest in providing a convenient
local forum for its citizens. Kilbreath v. Rudy, 16 Ohio St. 2d 70, 72-73 (1968).
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